A popular meme this month among Sabermetricians is to knock down Phil Hughes by explaining how his low Sabermetrics stats that relate to elements of the game he, as a pitcher, can’t control–fielding independent pitching (FIP), percentage of fly balls that go for homers, batting average of opposing hitters on balls put in play (BAbip)–must inevitably regress towards mean; mean in this case being either Hughes’ career averages or the league’s.
For these fans statistical models are destiny. If the league average BAbip is around .300, and Hughes’ is around .220, then inevitably more balls hit off Hughes will drop in, skid past the infielders, go for base hits until his BAbip approaches league average, and, resultantly more runs will be scored off the pitcher.
Maybe. But just as with the stock market past performance does not guarantee future success. Statistical models work as predicters of the future until some unforeseen change in conditions blows up the models revealing their flaws. And one would-be cause doesn’t necessarily produce the expected effect. Reversions to expected statistical means are useful in making educated guesses, particularly for veteran players (guys DO typically post the numbers on the backs of their baseball cards). But mostly what they do is predict the average case–any individual performer and any individual season can be an anomaly particularly with young athletes who are still making changes in their games and haven’t necessarily posted the kinds of averages against which they should be judged.
Hughes is clearly one such player–using his cutter in on the hands of lefties a la Mo Rivera, throwinga new changeup down and away from the same hitters, things he wasn’t doing as a reliever last year. Furthermore, who says something like more balls dropping must inevitably equal more runs scored? Guys can pitch out of jams, especially strikeout pitchers which Hughes is becoming. (I’ve previously used the example of Pedro Martinez in 1999 when he was 23-4 with a 2.07 ERA, a .205 batting average against, but a .325 baBIP in part thanks to a 13.3 K/9 ratio.)
Now, I’m not saying Hughes will not see more balls drop in or more fly balls go out. He may. But guys do have career years. In 1978 Ron Guidry was 25-3 with a 1.75 ERA, a .245 BAbip, a .195 batting average against and a 8.2 K/9 ratio. Those numbers were better than his career average of of a 3.29 ERA, .270 BAbip, .244 batting average against, and 6.7 K/9 ratio.
Why can’t Hughes have a year like that in 2010? He’s currently 5-0 with a 1.38 ERA, a .223 BAbip, a .165 batting average against, and an 9 K/9 ratio–numbers that are a little better after 20% of the season than Guidry’s 1978 totals? And his career averages are similar to Guidry’s–3.73 ERA, .281 BAbip, .230 batting average against, 8.4 K/9 ratio.
The question of course is rhetorical but the answer is clear: Hughes CAN have a year like Guidry’s in 1978. And another like Guidry had in 1979. He can even be better than Guidry given than Hughes will be 24 when he finishes this season, Guidry was 27 in 1978 and so Hughes may have a longer period of quality pitching after his career year, if, in fact, this year will be that career year. It might be. It might not be. The future is unpredictable, particularly given that Hughes, still 23, is an improving, changing pitcher not one whose approach and repertoire is set is stone. I’m not trying to predict the future, I’m must along for the thrill ride of watching Hughes work. At the moment he’s he best starting pitcher in the American League.
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